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A VIEW OF RACISM
2016 and America’s Original Sin
Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin
he election of Donald J. Trump as the forty-fifth president of the 
United States has reinvigorated the American left’s interest in combating 
racism in a way not seen since perhaps the Civil Rights Movement of the 
1950s and 1960s. Trump’s campaign rhetoric full of dog whistles gave way to 
an administration constituted by troubling people enacting troubling policies. 
Some have seen this as a wake-up call, while others have seen it as the unfortu-
nate but eminently foreseeable price of America’s original sin. Whether or not 
one sees the current political moment as a troubling aberration or as the laying 
bare of America’s racist underbelly, many have a sense of a renewed mission to 
eradicate or at least mitigate racism in this country.1
Many obstacles lie in the way of progress. This article draws attention to one: 
neither of the two main philosophical views about racism is fully up to the task 
of combating it. One view holds that racism is primarily a matter of institutional 
and social structures that perpetuate and enshrine racially disparate and oppres-
sive policies and outcomes. The other holds that racism is primarily a matter of 
individuals’ attitudes, such as beliefs about inferiority, hatred, and other forms 
of ill will. Both views appear congenial to the aim of combating racism. The first 
calls our attention to the sources of racism’s most impactful harms, while the 
second is committed to the impermissibility of racist conduct and attitudes. But, 
as examination of the case of Attorney General Jeff Sessions shows, they both 
1 It is important that the fight against racism not be characterized only as aiming at eradi-
cation. Racial realism, as described by Bell, for instance, holds that racism is a permanent 
feature of society (“Racial Realism”). The nature of the fight against racism, according to the 
racial realist, should not aim at eradication but rather mitigation. The goal is to “make life 
bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class,” to “better appreciate 
and cope with racial subordination,” and to recognize that “the fight itself has meaning . . . 
that the struggle for freedom is, at bottom, a manifestation of our humanity that survives 
and grows stronger through resistance to oppression, even if that oppression is never over-
come” (377–78). The anti-racist mission here is to mitigate the harms racism inflicts on the 
oppressed, even while the goal of eradicating racism is deemed illusory.
T
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fall short of providing proper guidance. We need to think differently about rac-
ism in order to effectively combat it. 
There is a second reason to adopt a different account of racism. Both of the 
main philosophical views appear to suggest that justificatory appeals to the con-
cept of race preceded the attitudes or structures that supposedly constitute rac-
ism. But this gets it backward. A careful reckoning with the past shows that the 
concept of race was invoked to justify racially disparate structures of domination 
and attitudes of superiority that were already in place. We want a view that prop-
erly attends to the unfolding of history.
In response, this article presents a third view of racism, one that adopts a 
genealogical as opposed to analytical approach. The main claims to be defended 
will be (1) that individuals’ attitudes as well as institutional structures are essen-
tial to a proper account of racism and (2) that this account must be essentially 
historical, taking proper notice, in particular, of the application of the concept 
of race in relation to the oppressive structures, relations, and attitudes that have 
come to characterize racism as we know it. The account offered here posits a 
drive to dominate that works in concert with the fact that the powerful get to 
write history, including the justifications for social relations and the institutions 
that encode them. Three virtues of the account are (a) its ability to support the 
anti-racist mission, (b) its description of the moral psychology implicated in rac-
ism, both interpersonal and institutional, and (c) its aid in allowing us to make 
proper sense of what racism is by attending closely to the ways in which it has 
evolved throughout history.
1. Two Views of Racism
Two kinds of analysis of racism dominate the philosophical literature.2 On 
the political view, racism is analyzed in terms of systematic oppression of one 
or more racial groups by a society’s basic institutions.3 For example, racism in 
2 This is not to say that these two kinds of analysis exhaust the range of available views. Crit-
ical race theory, in particular, deserves mention as an important view. Yet it does not dom-
inate the mainstream philosophical literature in the way these other two views do. Because 
this article seeks to intervene in that literature, it will take as its target the two kinds of view 
discussed in the text. But see Curry, “Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up?” for trenchant 
discussion of critical race theory’s exclusion from the philosophical mainstream and the 
argument that this is connected to the very problem under consideration—namely, racism. 
And see note 27, below, for discussion of some connections between critical race theory and 
the third view argued for here.
3 Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” and “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism”; Mills, The 
Racial Contract and “‘Heart’ Attack.”
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housing is analyzed in terms of racially targeted injustices in the various institu-
tions that make up the housing sector. These include entities such as the US De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, mortgage lending and servicing 
institutions, and local government agencies that enact and enforce zoning and 
tax regulations. On this view, racism with respect to housing stems from unjust 
social relations perpetuated and enshrined by these various institutions. On the 
moral view, by contrast, racism is primarily a matter of individuals’ attitudes.4 
Racism in housing is analyzed in terms of hatred, indifference, or disrespect to-
ward people on the basis of their racial designation on the part of the individuals 
who play relevant roles in the housing market. For example, a region may be said 
to exhibit racist housing practices when its housing market is dominated by con-
tract sellers who actively prey on home buyers of a particular racial designation 
out of malice or ill will. Because of their race, these home buyers are only offered 
predatory loans with deliberately unfair terms with the goal of swindling them 
as quickly as possible. On this second view, racism with respect to housing stems 
from the attitudes implicated in the conduct of particular individuals.
Each of these views has something going for it. The moral view has an easy 
time accounting for our condemnation of racism. If racism stems from objec-
tionable attitudes, such as hatred and disrespect, then it cries out for moral cen-
sure. This appears to give this view a leg up on its rival. The moral significance of 
racism, on the political view, is not so straightforward. For one thing, it is not at 
all clear how to conceive of the (im)morality of institutions and their practices. 
For another, it is not clear how to properly account for the link between moral 
condemnation and moral responsibility in this context.
One response to these worries on behalf of the political view would be to 
deny the claim that racism is always immoral.5 Instead, one might claim that 
racism is always morally significant.6 When we identify racism, this is the begin-
ning of the moral conversation, not the end. In the final analysis, we may not find 
anyone or anything that is deserving of moral condemnation. The thought here, 
expressed by some proponents of the political view, is that there may be people 
who innocently harbor racist beliefs or perpetuate racial injustice.7
The political view is not primarily concerned with individual morality, which 
4 Garcia, “The Heart of Racism”; Blum, “Racism: What It Is and What It Isn’t”; Glasgow, 
“Racism as Disrespect.”
5 Cf. Garcia, “The Heart of Racism”; Haslanger, “Oppressions”; Glasgow, “Racism as Disre-
spect.”
6 Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?”
7 See discussion of the “benevolent” racist in Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack,” and Shelby, “Is Racism 
in the ‘Heart’?”
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seems to be part of its attraction. This account of racism focuses squarely on the 
large-scale and pressing issues of entrenched, institutionalized racial bias and 
harm. In this way, it appears to place the scope and depth of the problem square-
ly in its analytical crosshairs. Racism touches our lives in many ways. It results in 
material harm for some and privilege for others. It also influences our attitudes 
and relationships, with respect to people and institutions, in ways that too often 
go unnoticed. By focusing on the social structures that contribute to material 
inequality and interpersonal bias, the political view appears to focus our atten-
tion on ways to effect widespread and impactful change, after which changes 
in hearts and minds may follow. Tackling the basic institutions that structure a 
racist society seems the best way to make a real and lasting impact in the fight 
against racism. Thus, there appears to be a pragmatic reason to prefer this ac-
count. Moreover, we ignore the racist structure of our institutions not only at the 
peril of those whose lives are made worse or cut short as a result, but also at the 
peril of an accurate sense of the way things work.8
It would be a mistake to think that the moral view does not also have some-
thing insightful to say about institutional racism. Some may claim that racism is 
always and only a matter of individual attitudes. But this seems obviously mis-
taken, and disingenuous. The moral view may analyze racism in terms of indi-
vidual attitudes, but it need not stop there. It is compatible with recognizing 
the role that racist attitudes have played in the origination, development, and 
maintenance of the institutions that structure society. Institutional racism, on 
this view, results when the racist attitudes of individuals infect the social fabric.9 
Educational institutions, for instance, may be said to become racist when the 
ill will of individual actors within them leads to the adoption and maintenance 
of policies with unjust racial disparities. Once these policies are in place, they 
infect the attitudes of those who pass through the racist educational system. Stu-
dents learn a whitewashed historical narrative that reflects the beliefs of those 
who designed it—for example, beliefs about the inferiority of indigenous people 
and enslaved African people. Internalizing this narrative, many of these students 
come to harbor these very same beliefs. Then they pass them on to the next 
generation. The foundations of institutional racism, conceived of as stemming 
from individual attitudes, are thus self-reinforcing. And institutions can be racist 
even when none of the individuals who currently make them up harbor objec-
tionable attitudes, so long as the infection has become sufficiently entrenched in 
the institution’s policies and practices. Thus, the moral view can be seen to offer 
a more sophisticated analysis than initially meets the eye.
8 This is one of the insights behind Curry’s “necessary knowledge thesis” (“Race”).
9 Garcia, “The Heart of Racism.”
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The political view, too, comes in a cruder and a more sophisticated version. It 
has become a commonplace belief that explicit racism is on the decline; people 
do not spout epithets and endorse overtly racist policies like they used to. There 
are those who think that people do not harbor racist attitudes anymore. But if 
the 2016 election and its aftermath taught us anything, it is that this is simply 
not true. There’s nothing like a political victory to make one feel comfortable 
screaming in public what a short time ago was fit for the country club or chat 
room only. This is not anathema to the analytical framework of the political view. 
Those who analyze racism in terms of institutional oppression can make sense 
of “real racists” in terms of participation in and habituation to a racist society, 
undergirded by racist institutions. All of us, to some degree or another, come 
to hold racist attitudes—explicit, implicit, or both—because of the way we are 
shaped by our social context. It is precisely because of the racist institutions that 
shape our collective modes of thought that we come, as individuals, to harbor 
the very attitudes some have claimed are only features of the past.
As should be clear by now, the sophisticated versions of the moral and polit-
ical views largely agree when it comes to the scope of racism. They differ, mainly, 
in terms of explanatory priority. This has consequences for how they envision 
effective change. According to the moral view, institutional racism is real, but it 
is ultimately explained by appeal to individuals’ attitudes. Systemic change re-
quires that we change hearts and minds. The political view, by contrast, holds 
that the racist structure of social institutions ultimately explains the racist beliefs 
and intentions of individuals. And eradicating or mitigating racism, on this view, 
is a matter of restructuring the scaffolding on which society is built. Only by 
changing racist policies and practices will we change the hearts and minds of 
individual racists.
Each of these views has its attractions. But they cannot both be correct. Thus, 
it may seem as if a firm grasp of what racism is and how to combat it requires 
choosing between them. But that is not the case. Careful consideration of an ex-
ample drawn from the 2016 election and transition, as well as examination of the 
impression they give about the relationship between race and racism, suggests 
that neither view is satisfactory.
2. The Pragmatic Aim and the Case of Jeff Sessions
Though they offer distinct analyses of racism, the political view and the moral 
view are both closely connected to what we can call the pragmatic aim: the aim 
of eliminating, or at least mitigating, racism. This aim is apparently furthered by 
the political view’s commitment to focusing on institutional and social struc-
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tures, the elimination of which would effect widespread and materially bene-
ficial changes in the lives of those who suffer most from racial oppression. As 
suggested above, this seems to be one major attraction of the political view. But 
the pragmatic aim is related also to the moral view in that it is justified by that 
view’s commitment to the necessary immorality of racism.10 To claim that rac-
ism is immoral is to claim that there are reasons to combat it. Thus, it seems fair 
to ask how the two familiar views of racism fare with respect to furthering the 
pragmatic aim. Do these views offer proper guidance to those who aim to com-
bat racism?11
In short: no. And the battle over Senator Jeff Sessions’s nomination and con-
firmation for the post of attorney general in the Trump administration can help 
us see why.
Many objected to Sessions’s nomination on the grounds that he is racist and 
that the Department of Justice would, under his leadership, fail to combat, and 
likely exacerbate, the racism endemic to the American criminal justice system. 
But some opposed to his nomination argued that Sessions’s own attitudes were 
beside the point; opposition to his nomination should focus on his record.12 
This would seem to comport well with the political view’s focus on institutions. 
The call to focus on a public official’s record is a call to focus on the institutional 
policies enacted during his tenure and, in this case, their consequences vis-à-
vis racial justice. At the same time, however, it would appear to undermine the 
pragmatic aim of reforming racist institutions. Institutional change comes about 
through the actions of individuals, who are themselves moved by their atti-
tudes.13 Attending to what is in the heart and mind of the individual in charge is 
not a distraction from, but rather a key element of, any plan to effect institutional 
change.14 Thus, the political view undermines efforts to combat structural injus-
tice if it ignores the personal attitudes of certain key actors in the institutional 
structure. If the goal is to mitigate or eliminate racism in the criminal justice 
system, Sessions’s attitudes are relevant to his qualifications for attorney general.
It may be objected that the political view does not really ignore individuals’ 
10 Garcia, “The Heart of Racism”; Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect.” This commitment is not 
confined to proponents of the moral view; see Haslanger, “Oppressions: Racial and Other.”
11 It bears repeating that, as mentioned in note 1, above, those who take racism to be a perma-
nent feature of society may consistently aim to combat it.
12 Bouie, “Jeff Sessions Fights for Racist Outcomes. Who Cares What’s in His Heart?”
13 The conceptual claims about institutions in the text, both here and passim, have been influ-
enced by Searle’s account of institutional facts (The Construction of Social Reality). 
14 See Madva, “A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism,” for a convincing argument for this claim, 
in the context of combating discrimination, based on empirical evidence from the social 
sciences.
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attitudes. Rather, it calls our attention to the fact that institutions can be racist 
even if the individuals who run them do not harbor racial biases or other prob-
lematic attitudes.15 It is true that the political view calls our attention to this fact 
and is correct to do so.16 But this does not adequately address the complaint 
that changing institutional policy requires more attention to individual attitudes 
than the political view appears to give. The existence of a racist institution may 
not depend on the attitudes of the individuals involved in its present-day oper-
ations, but combating institutional racism does. It is exceedingly unlikely, if not 
impossible, for a racist institution to adopt and implement non-racist policies in 
the absence of leadership that is both attuned to the problem and motivated to 
do something about it.
Consider now the moral view. Does it fare any better in accounting for the 
Sessions controversy? It seems not. To begin with, the difficulties inherent in 
trying to determine the attitudes that reside in a person’s heart may preclude 
coming to any firm conclusion about whether or not Sessions is racist. This diffi-
culty was reflected in the confirmation process and its coverage by the press. But 
even if we were to set that aside, the moral view, too, faces the problem of un-
dermining the pragmatic aim of combating racism. The trouble here is different 
from the one facing the political view. While the moral view calls for attending 
to the attitudes of individuals, it focuses too narrowly on those that constitute 
ill will, possibly manifested by indifference.17 The worry about Sessions was not 
just that he might be actively opposed or indifferent to the interests of African 
Americans (among other groups), but also that his leadership would fail to bring 
about (and even forestall) changes in the criminal justice system necessary to 
combat the institutional racism already present.
Given the worry that Sessions’s tenure in charge of the Department of Jus-
tice would perpetuate the racism already endemic to the criminal justice system, 
there is good reason to focus more widely than just on attitudes that constitute 
ill will or indifference. It takes more than lack of active antipathy toward or indif-
ference to the plight of the oppressed to motivate effective change at the institu-
15 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal for raising the concerns 
addressed here in comments on an earlier version of this article.
16 It is also true, as noted above, that the sophisticated moral view also allows that racist insti-
tutions may be run by individuals with no objectionable attitudes. It insists, however, that 
such institutions must have been infected by racist attitudes at some earlier time.
17 Garcia, “The Heart of Racism.” For insightful discussion of the expressive significance of 
“emotional indifference” in the context of moral responsibility, see Smith, “Responsibility 
for Attitudes,” esp. 242–46. Smith’s Wybrow case may not be a perfect fit for the present dis-
cussion, but her comments are suggestive of the claim that one may exhibit objectionable 
attitudes toward others simply by exhibiting indifference toward their interests.
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tional level. It takes positive concern for effecting this change. Even supposing 
that we could somehow determine that Sessions did not harbor racial ill will, the 
pragmatic aim of combating racism calls for more in this context. Even on the 
moral view, many of the racial disparities in the criminal justice system count as 
racist—the institution has a long history of infection by the racist attitudes of 
individuals implicated in the setting and carrying out of policy.18 Eliminating or 
at least mitigating this requires more than putting in charge someone without 
racial ill will; it requires putting in charge someone with attitudes that will moti-
vate the necessary reforms. The moral view recommends looking into Sessions’s 
heart, but not deep enough.19
At this point it may be objected that proper guidance in combating racism 
is not an appropriate criterion of adequacy for these analyses of what racism is; 
neither the political view nor the moral view need have this as a goal.20 There 
is something to this objection. An analysis of racism need not be committed to 
combating it. Indeed, it may turn out that the correct analysis reveals that racism 
is ineradicable and that we cannot do anything to mitigate its effects. Never-
theless, the preceding considerations should be enough to motivate, at the very 
least, a hard look at the moral and political views by those who share the aim of 
combating racism.
3. Race and Racism
The lesson from consideration of Sessions’s nomination is that the analyses of 
racism offered by the political view and the moral view undermine the pragmat-
ic aim because they do not take proper account of individuals’ attitudes in the 
context of institutional racism. The political view does not pay proper attention 
to the attitudes of individuals; the moral view does not pay attention to the prop-
er range of attitudes. Neither of these analyses provides an adequate account 
of how to combat institutional racism in this particular case. Especially in the 
context of the current political climate, marked by a reinvigorated commitment 
to the pragmatic aim, this gives us good reason to look for an alternative under-
18 For ease of exposition, we can refer to the various elements comprising the American crim-
inal justice system as a single institution, and we can refer to the US attorney general, in his 
role as head of the Department of Justice, as the leader of this institution.
19 In fact, it is not enough that we consider attitudes of good and ill will. Effective institutional 
change requires not just motivation, but also know-how. As the point was put above, in 
connection with the political view, institutional leadership will be more likely to change 
institutional course when it is both attuned to the problem and motivated to do something 
about it. (I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.) 
20 I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
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standing of racism. But that is not the only reason to abandon the two familiar 
views. They also fail to adequately highlight the historical relationship between 
race and racism.
The moral view analyzes racism in terms of attitudes that already appeal to 
race—for example, beliefs about or hatred of African Americans. The political 
view analyzes racism in terms of institutional oppression of a particular group of 
people on the basis of their racial designation. Whether or not they require it, the 
suggestion, in both cases, seems to be that we do not have racism until we have 
appeals to race. This gets it backward.21 When we find racism, throughout time 
and across the globe, what we find is oppression that becomes racialized when 
the bodies of its victims are cited as justification. We see race invoked for the 
purpose of justifying domination of certain human beings by others.
This can be seen in historical discussions of the development of racism in 
the West.22 The broad-strokes historical narrative is as follows. One result of Eu-
ropeans’ increased mercantile travel in the late Medieval and early Renaissance 
eras was greater awareness of different cultures and skin tones. They came into 
contact with societies and body types they had not known existed or had little 
previous contact with. A second consequence was, of course, the colonization, 
enslavement, or eradication of these people and their lands. Through increased 
exploration, the European elite not only acquired new knowledge of what the 
world was like, but also new means of exploiting people for their own material 
gain. This changed internal class relations in European society. It became more 
economically advantageous to exploit foreigners rather than the serfs of one’s 
own country. And this exploitation came to be justified in racial terms. These 
people did not have rights to land, labor, or bodily integrity because they were 
“black” (or “brown” or “red” or “yellow”).
This historical narrative stands in opposition to the suggestion that we do 
not have racism until we have appeals to race. The analyses of racism offered by 
the moral and political views may be taken to suggest that the initial harmful 
treatment of Africans or indigenous Americans at the hands of European colo-
nizers did not count as racism. It only came to be racist once these people were 
oppressed on the grounds of their perceived racial designations. The moral view 
gives the impression that racism resulted when the individuals engaged in the 
harmful treatment internalized the relevant racial designations and acquired at-
titudes of ill will that reflected them. The political view gives the impression that 
racism did not result until institutions reflected these racial designations in their 
21 As Ta-Nehisi Coates puts it: “race is the child of racism, not the father” (Between the World 
and Me, 7).
22 Mills, The Racial Contract; West, “A Genealogy of Modern Racism.”
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oppressive policies. This suggests that there was a moment when the oppression 
of these groups of people was profoundly transformed. It suggests that with the 
advent of race as a justifying factor, something new came on the scene. Harm-
ful treatment of conquered peoples became exploitation and extermination of 
subhuman groups. But it seems more accurate to say that the availability of the 
notion of race allowed for a new way of justifying more of the same. The people 
being exterminated and enslaved were already regarded as subhuman, but there 
was not yet a need to recognize that this was the case, let alone offer a justi-
fication for it. That need came, among other things, from the readily apparent 
conflict between such treatment and the Enlightenment ideals of equality and 
freedom.
4. A Third View
We have good reason to look for a view that highlights the historical interplay 
between the concept of race and the attitudes, structures, and conduct that we 
recognize as racist. Let us begin with a closer look at a historical account of a 
clearly racist system of practices that involved both individual racist conduct 
and racist institutional policies: slavery in America. As Barbara J. Fields details, 
the driving forces behind the enslavement of Africans in America were econom-
ic.23 Africans were not the first people exploited for their labor in the American 
colonies—poor English and Irish serfs were brought over as cheap labor from 
the beginning of the American colonial program. But African captives quickly 
became the most profitable source of labor. This was made easier because they 
were taken from their geographic, social, and political contexts and transported 
to a foreign one. 
In line with the historical narrative outlined in the previous section, the or-
igins of the institution of chattel slavery in the American colonies had little if 
anything to do with race, and everything to do with the history of people, mar-
kets, and trade. The rationale of race may have been required for the institution 
of chattel slavery, where enslavement was a heritable condition, to come to fru-
ition. But the factors that drove development of this institution were economic 
and political. It is more profitable to claim the offspring of one’s property also 
as property, and it is easier to perpetually enslave a people who are not already a 
part of the development of the society and its defining notions. Part of the rea-
son race was needed to justify slavery in America was that this budding country 
was founded on the notion of liberty and equality for all. This notion grew out 
of Enlightenment thinking, following long political struggles in Europe between 
23 Fields, “Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America.”
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the landed elite and the exploited serfs. Because enslaved Africans did not take 
part in these struggles, it was easier to leave them out of consideration when 
putting these ideals into practice. 
When it came time to square the reality of everyday life in the American col-
onies with the aspirations of the revolutionary rhetoric espoused by the elites on 
this side of the Atlantic, something had to give. Those in power in the colonies 
needed a justification for treating one group of people in a manner that their 
professed principles deemed immoral. Their response was to exempt people of 
African descent from moral and political consideration—to dehumanize them. 
They appealed to race. The designation of the enslaved as “black” allowed the 
“white” people in power to distinguish between human beings on the basis of 
bodily appearance for the purposes of economic exploitation. Along with this 
came a moral and political hierarchy that purported to justify the institutional-
ized practice of chattel slavery. Thus was white supremacy born in the American 
colonies.
This is not to say that white supremacy has its exclusive origins in America. 
Other European colonial adventures also involved perceived and institutional-
ized racial hierarchies. And it is not to insist that the notion of English superi-
ority over Africans was absent prior to the development of the institution of 
African slavery in the American colonies.24 Nor is it to downplay the impact of 
white supremacy on the indigenous population in America, as well as in other 
colonized regions of the globe. But it is to claim that these various instances of 
white supremacy share an origin story. They featured the human drive to domi-
nate coupled with a developing social hierarchy under the influence of Enlight-
enment notions of equal standing in the moral and political spheres. This com-
bination was unstable. The claimed equal standing for all people threatened the 
developing economic, political, and moral hierarchy. The system and its inequi-
ties stood in need of justification. And that justification came to rest on readily 
apparent differences in what people looked like. It appealed to race.
This origin story supports a view of racism that differs from both the moral 
view and the political view in two key ways. First, the racialization of oppres-
sion—the birth of racism—derived neither primarily from individuals’ atti-
tudes nor from social institutions. It came from both at once. The institution 
of slavery in America predated the racialized justifications of it that are now so 
familiar, and the same is true of antipathy toward enslaved people. Subjugated 
people, no matter their skin tone or continental origin, were believed to be infe-
24 See Vaughn, “The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,” 
for an overview of the debate among historians regarding the question of which came first, 
racism or African slavery, in the colony of Virginia.
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rior. Early American colonists worked English indentured servants to death and 
traded them as property. Even free English colonists who did not command ser-
vants or own slaves looked down upon those who lacked independence. Racism 
bloomed in America when these attitudes and practices came to be justified by 
appeal to what people looked like. The institution of slavery became racialized, 
not just in operation, but also rationalization. Second, just as a bloom is the most 
visible form of a flower that grows from seed to bud, attitudes and practices jus-
tified in racialized terms announce to the world the racism that has been present 
for some time. The notion of race does not as much change these practices, as it 
does clarify what they have been all along. Racism comes to full fruition when 
existing oppressive practices are reinterpreted in racialized terms in the service 
of justifying the exploits of those in power. This is a moment not of transforma-
tion but of revelation.
Two elements remain constant, both before and after the invocation of race: 
(1) the drive to dominate and (2) the dominion of the dominant. These are the 
very features that serve as key ingredients in the recipe for white supremacy sug-
gested above. Colonial elites and their European counterparts responded to the 
perceived need to justify the institution of African slavery in the Americas by 
invoking a distinction between people. The designation of one as “black”—that 
is, not “white”—was made available as a means of justifying oppressive practices 
and attitudes at the heart of colonial American society. The belief that certain 
people were inferior had its origins in the observation that they were unfree. But 
when it came to be the belief that this was so because they were “black” it served to 
justify their subjugation at the hands of those who were superior—now, because 
they were “white.” The subjugation came first and the racialized justification sec-
ond, but, in contrast to the impression given by the familiar moral and political 
views, it was racist long before it was readily recognizable as such.
This historical narrative suggests that we have good reason to prefer a view of 
racism that is (1) essentially historical and (2) pluralistic—that is, the key ele-
ments in the analysis of racism are both irreducible. Call it the genealogical view.
The genealogical view of racism denies an analytical approach that seeks to 
identify necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be racist.25 Instead, 
it aims to provide an account of what racism is by attending to what its causes were. 
25 While I believe that this is the approach of those views I have labeled moral and political, 
an anonymous reviewer for this journal has helpfully drawn my attention to the fact that 
there are other ways of understanding what some instances of these views are trying to do. 
As opposed to articulating necessary and sufficient conditions on something being racist, 
they may, rather, be aiming to identify key or distinctive features of racism. In that case, it 
is my contention that the genealogical view has the advantage of highlighting the historical 
dimensions of racism and placing them at the center of its analysis. Doing so allows us also 
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Racism, on this view, is properly understood in terms of individual attitudes, so-
cial institutions, and conceptual ingenuity that were interwoven in various ways, 
at various times and places. The key claim of the genealogical view is that racist 
attitudes and racist social structures developed in tandem from attitudes and 
structures marked by the drive to dominate and the dominion of the dominant, 
and the racialized justifications merely announced what was already present. 
Pre-racial oppressive attitudes and institutions evolved into racialized ones by 
taking aim at victims conceptualized in terms of race. The roles of oppressor and 
oppressed were thus reinterpreted in racial terms. “White” people—which is 
to say, those in power—justified their oppression of “black” people on racial 
grounds. And these grounds were invented, or co-opted, to do just that.26 But 
racialized justifications did not so much transform what they were applied to as 
much as they clarified it. The view is historical in that it calls our attention to the 
development of racism over the course of actual human history; it is essentially 
historical in that it claims that this historical development is inseparable from a 
proper understanding of the concept. It would be an obfuscation to claim that 
racism can be understood apart from grasping the way it developed over time.
The genealogical view further differs from the moral and political views in 
claiming that the essential analysans of those more familiar views are both re-
quired for an adequate understanding of what racism is. Whereas the moral view 
claims that the analytical buck stops, ultimately, with individual attitudes and 
the political view claims that it stops with basic social institutions, the genealogi-
cal view claims that neither of these elements is analytically primary to the other. 
Indeed, it claims that they are analytically inseparable.27 
to better appreciate the psychological mechanisms implicated in the development of racist 
attitudes and institutions.
26 One view has it that the concept of race was invented as a justification for racist practices. 
Bernard Boxill (“Introduction”) argues, against this, that the concept of race was originally 
developed by Europeans in order to explain the differences in appearance and culture they 
discovered through increased global travel. Later on, he contends, this concept corrupted 
Europeans’ natural sympathy and gave rise to the racist practices that came to mark the co-
lonial era. The view laid out in the text need not take a stand on the origins of the concept of 
race. It may have been invented by Europeans to justify their exploitation of non-European 
people, or it may have originally been invented to explain the differences between people 
and then coopted as a rationale for oppression. Either way, the account in the text stands: 
the concept of race was used as a justification for oppressive attitudes and practices in the 
face of Enlightenment ideals of equality and freedom.
27 There are some notable affinities between the genealogical view offered here and extant 
accounts that fall out of the philosophical mainstream (see note 2, above). It is worth briefly 
noting how the view offered here differs from these other views. West offers a genealogical 
account of racism (“A Genealogy of Modern Racism”), and both West’s account and that 
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According to the genealogical view, pre-racial oppressive social institutions, 
in part, explain the development of racialized attitudes, such as hatred of “black” 
people and beliefs about their inferiority. These attitudes were cultivated in or-
der to justify various oppressive institutional practices, such as African slavery 
in the American colonies. And these same institutions, now justified in racial 
terms, served to inculcate racist attitudes through the perpetuation and support 
of ideologies. At the same time, pre-racialized attitudes toward the enslaved 
explained the development and maintenance of the oppressive institutions in 
need of justification. Slavery in the North American colonies was initially jus-
tified by outright antipathy toward the enslaved and the belief that, no matter 
their appearance or continental origin, they were inferior. All of this predated 
the development of justifications in terms of race and their internalization. But 
once racialized attitudes came on the scene, they explained the further devel-
opment and maintenance of the racist institutions they were meant to justify. 
Even after the abolition of slavery, African Americans were oppressed by means 
of Jim Crow, followed by the “colorblind” racial injustices that characterize con-
offered by McWhorter (Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy) have 
Foucaultian elements shared by the genealogical view offered here—for example, all three 
views allow that ideologies have the power to shape individuals and institutions and stress 
the importance of history. The genealogical view offered here departs from these others in at 
least this way: it stresses the importance of individuals’ attitudes both with respect to their 
genetic contribution to the relevant oppressive institutional structures and with respect to 
their role in maintaining or evolving these structures. There is also an affinity between the 
genealogical view offered here and prominent accounts in the tradition of critical race the-
ory. For example, the legal realism that inspires Bell’s racial realism stresses the importance 
of personal values to a proper understanding of legal decisions (“Racial Realism”). Thus, 
like the genealogical view offered here, racial realism is attuned to the complex interplay be-
tween personal attitudes and institutional structures. And there is shared interest in tracing 
the historical development and maintenance of racist oppression, seeking to account for the 
interplay between attitudes and structures over time. Finally, the genealogical view offered 
here shares some of the central tenets of critical race theory as laid out by Curry, such as a 
commitment to the social construction of the concept of race and its deployment to subju-
gate particular groups of people (“Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up?” 4–5). But the gene-
alogical view offered in the text departs from views in the tradition of critical race theory in 
at least two key respects. First, it identifies a particular element of human psychology—the 
drive to dominate—as playing a central role in the development and maintenance of racism. 
Second, it is compatible with, but not committed to, claims about the permanence of racism. 
According to the genealogical view offered here, the question of racism’s permanence will 
turn, crucially, on the questions of whether the drive to dominate is a permanent feature 
of human psychology and whether race is a permanent object for its expression. Thus, the 
view offered here places a novel feature of our psychology at center stage in the discussion 
of racism’s past and future.
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temporary America, especially in the criminal justice system.28 The evolution of 
institutional racial oppression in America has been propelled forward, at least 
in part, by the racist attitudes of individuals. But the development of these atti-
tudes is not properly explained without appeal to the institutional contexts that 
gave rise to them. Thus, the genealogical view weaves a historical narrative, to 
which both attitudes and institutions are essential. At the heart of this narrative 
are the psychological element of the drive to dominate and the social fact of the 
dominion of the dominant.
5. Objections
Let us now consider two objections to the genealogical view, both of which 
amount to the charge that it does not offer a proper analysis of racism.29 The 
first objection is that the genealogical view does not provide the proper tools to 
identify instances of racism because it does not offer a necessary condition on 
something’s being racist. Racist attitudes and institutions might arise in some 
other ways than they actually have; even if history had been different, racism 
might still exist. The second objection is that the genealogical view does not 
appear to offer clear answers to questions we want answered by an analysis of a 
concept like racism. For instance, it does not tell us exactly when an attitude or 
institution comes to be racist. 
These objections do not appear to apply to the moral or political views. The 
moral view suggests that a necessary condition on racism, whether personal or 
institutional, is the presence of attitudes of ill will toward people on account 
of their racial designation. And it tells us that personal or institutional conduct 
becomes racist at the point when these attitudes infect it. The political view 
suggests that a necessary condition on racism is the presence of institutional 
structures that enshrine and perpetuate unjust social relations with disparate 
racial impact. And it tells us that conduct or policies become racist when appro-
priately influenced by institutions that target groups or individuals for harmful 
treatment on the basis of their racial designations. The above objections suggest 
criteria of adequacy for a satisfactory account of racism, and the two familiar 
views appear to pass with flying colors.
How should the proponent of the genealogical view reply? One strategy 
would be to articulate ways in which the view, despite appearances, really does 
satisfy the suggested criteria for adequacy. But the best response is to insist that 
28 Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow; Alexander, The New Jim Crow.
29 I owe these to correspondence with Jorge L. A. Garcia on a different version of some of 
these ideas.
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these objections address the wrong questions. The request for a necessary con-
dition on the existence of racism rests on counterfactual aspirations. It asks: if 
things had gone differently, would such and such still count as racist? The essen-
tial historicality of the genealogical view is antithetical to this approach. Rather 
than ask what would be the case if things had been thus and so, the genealogical 
view focuses on the question: how did things come to be as they are? There is 
value in unearthing the actual unfolding of history and analyzing racism as we 
find it.
One might think that this is to miss the point. The counterfactual aspirations 
behind the request for a necessary condition need not supplant historical inqui-
ry. They may rather supplement it in service of the pragmatic aim of mitigating 
and eradicating racism. If we have a clear means of identifying racism, however 
it might arise, then we will be in a better position to nip it in the bud as novel 
forms creep into existence.
This brings us to the second objection. It would seem that the pragmatic aim 
requires being able to identify when a given attitude, conduct, policy, or institu-
tion comes to be racist. But that is not so. The genealogical view has help to give 
in identifying, and perhaps even preventing, new and novel instances of racism, 
even though it eschews a precise answer to the question when a given individual 
or institution comes to be racist. For one thing, the view highlights the central 
role of the drive to dominate in the development of racist people and institu-
tions. Where we find this drive operating in a context in which it either targets 
or is likely to target individuals or groups on the basis of a racial designation, we 
have reason to suspect racism is in the offing. Moreover, the view highlights the 
dominion of the dominant as also playing an important role. Thus, increasingly 
entrenched dominance of one racial group over another, whether interpersonal 
or institutional, is a red flag. And the historical focus of the genealogical view 
provides us with blueprints for the rise of new forms of racism based on past 
patterns. It prompts us to learn history’s lessons.
6. Making Sense of 2016
Let us now to return to the case of Sessions’s nomination to the post of attorney 
general. Some of the genealogical view’s virtues will become clearer through in-
vestigation of how it fares better than the two familiar views in making sense of 
this case.
Recall the lessons learned from considering the moral and political views 
in relation to the Sessions case. In light of the pragmatic aim, the moral view 
appeared to focus too narrowly on attitudes constitutive of ill will. When it 
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comes to examining the attitudes of a nominee to head up an institution with 
racially disparate harmful effects, it will not do to make sure he does not harbor 
ill will toward members of disadvantaged racial groups. Change in the policies 
and procedures of the institution—here, the American criminal justice system—
requires attitudes that spur active pursuit of positive change in the treatment 
of disadvantaged groups. The political view appeared to focus primarily, if not 
exclusively, on matters at the level of institutional policy and public record. Ef-
fective change in these areas, however, requires action by individuals, especially 
those in charge of relevant policy decisions. An institution already on course to 
make racially disparate negative impacts will not steer a different course if its 
captain is not motivated and prepared to change tack.
Now consider how the genealogical view fares in its treatment of the Sessions 
case. To begin with, it is not subject to either of the above difficulties. Unlike the 
political view, the genealogical view does not privilege institutional structures 
in its analysis of racism. Thus, it does not call our attention to these structures at 
the expense of investigating also the attitudes of individuals, especially those in 
positions of power and capable of steering the institution’s course. Indeed, the 
genealogical view would justify special concern about the attitudes of these in-
dividuals, as they would be the ones in positions of dominance. 
Unlike the moral view, the genealogical view does not focus narrowly on 
attitudes constitutive of ill will. The key psychological ingredient in the genea-
logical view is the drive to dominate, and myriad attitudes may serve to refocus 
this drive in order to promote what amounts to racist conduct or policy.30 Yet 
this drive and (at least some of) these attitudes are not themselves constitutive 
of ill will. The desire for profit is an instructive example. This desire is not in 
itself constitutive of ill will, but it can be a significant part of the explanation of 
why a given individual or institution comes to oppress people on the basis of 
their racial designation. We saw this in the above historical narrative of African 
slavery in the colonies. And it has been implicated in the development of the 
“prison-industrial-complex” in the context of the US criminal justice system in its 
present form.31 The basic idea, in both cases, is that the drive to dominate comes 
to focus on a particular racial category because this is profitable. The resulting 
institutional structures are then reinterpreted in order to justify these practices 
in racialized terms. Just as slavery before it, criminality has come to be justified 
by appeal to a person’s skin color—“black” men are “superpredators.”
The genealogical view not only avoids the apparent pitfalls of the moral and 
30 The characterization in the text of the drive to dominate has been influenced by Katsafanas, 
“Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology.”
31  Davis, Abolition Democracy.
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political views, it also makes better sense of the widespread alarm over Sessions’s 
nomination to the post of attorney general. This largely had to do with history, 
both his personal history and the history of the institution he was being nomi-
nated to lead. Sessions’s record as an elected and appointed official—US attorney 
for Alabama, Alabama attorney general, and US senator from Alabama—provid-
ed what many found to be ample grounds for concern about racism.32 They were 
concerned about his personal attitudes regarding African Americans and about 
how he would steer federal policy with respect to their treatment by elements 
of the criminal justice system (e.g., oversight of local and state police). These 
concerns were especially pointed in the context of his nomination as US attorney 
general because this would put him in charge of an institution that has been well 
documented as a tool for racial oppression.33 It would be difficult to sympatheti-
cally understand the extent of concern over his nomination without an adequate 
grasp of the history of this institution in America. Here the essential historicality 
of the genealogical view shows itself to be a real advantage. It can make sense of 
the level of concern about Sessions’s nomination by highlighting not only the 
history of the American criminal justice system, but also the role Sessions has 
played in this history during his time in public office.
7. Concluding Remarks
Trump’s electoral victory has reinvigorated anti-racism movements on the left. 
But the familiar moral and political views do not provide adequate analyses of 
racism, and they fall short of providing proper guidance for the anti-racist proj-
ect. We should look to a view that focuses on racism’s lineage and avoids the mo-
nistic focus on a single, ultimate analytical factor—attitudes or institutions—in 
favor of a pluralistic focus that recognizes the historical interplay between them. 
This is what the genealogical view seeks to do. It is thus able to capture the messy 
reality of racism and put us in a position to more effectively combat it.34
Sam Houston State University
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32 Serwer, “What Jeff Sessions’s Role in Prosecuting the Klan Reveals about His Civil-Rights 
Record.”
33 Alexander, The New Jim Crow.
34 Several anonymous reviewers deserve thanks for very helpful comments on earlier versions 
of this article. I thank Jorge L. A. Garcia for comments on an earlier version of some of these 
ideas and, especially, for encouraging me to pursue them further. My debt to his own work 
on racism is, I hope, evident. Special thanks are due to David Wright for many helpful con-
versations on these ideas throughout all stages of their development.
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